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1 Introduction
In line with the successive reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy, the European Union
(EU), gradually eliminates price support in favor of non-distortional measures that are decou-
pled from production. In the same time, the EU also develops an EU quality policy in order
to fit consumer concerns about the attributes of food products, such as quality and geograph-
ical characteristics (Marette (2005)). This policy aims at sustaining the economic viability of
businesses that were hurt by the gradual decrease in public support but that provide such qual-
ity goods. Accordingly, the EC regulation introduced in 1992 (European-Commission (1992)
and European-Commission (2006)) on the protection of geographical indications and designa-
tions of origin is expected to sustain competitiveness and profitability within the agricultural
sector through the diversification of agricultural production. In particular, the development of
product differentiation schemes PDO (Protected Designations of Origin) and PGI (Protected
Geographical Indications) aims at providing high-quality reputation food products. The PDO
label certifies both a high product quality and the product’s geographical origin. Its quality
is inherent to a limited geographical area characterized by geological, agronomic, climatic, and
historical factors. It also depends on specific manufacturing process and human factor require-
ments. Some countries have adopted this kind of quality policy for many years. For instance, the
Appellation d’Origine Controlée (AOC) regulation in France and the Denominazione di Origine
Controllata (DOC) in Italy were created in 1935 and 1963, respectively.1
Public intervention through public label regulation is proved to enhance social welfare (cf. Mos-
chini et al. (2008); Marette and Crespi (2003) and Lence et al. (2007)). Public labels certify the
quality of a product that cannot be otherwise observable (credence goods) and recognized as
such by consumers (Akerlof (1970)). By restoring information to consumers, the development
of product differentiation schemes gives producers more incentive to produce high-quality prod-
ucts.2
The success of the PDO label in creating value added for agro-food producers has been studied
through the measurement of the willingness to pay of consumers for these quality labels (De-
selnicu et al. (2011)). However, the empirical research on PDO has not yet determined which
suppliers have an incentive to adopt this type of public certification. Our goal is to assess em-
pirically the ability of such a public quality policy to sustain the competitiveness of firms and to
determine which firms have benefited from it. To achieve this, we provide an empirical analysis
1AOC recognition follows the creation of the INAO (National Institute for Appellation of Origin) in 1935 in
the wine and liquor sector and has been extended to cheese in 1955. A specific regulation for Roquefort cheese
allowed the creation of the first AOC cheese in 1925. Since 1992, AOC also applies to all agricultural and food
products.
2cf. Bonroy and Constantatos (2008) for a more general discussion on labeling profitability.
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of the French AOC label, which is older than its EU equivalent, the PDO.3 We investigate how
the AOC policy affects the survival of cheese firms in France in addition to their firm character-
istics such as its size, age or relative efficiency.
The adoption of PDO by producers is voluntary and confers a collective reputation to the
certified producers.4 The profitability of acceding to this collective reputation depends on the
trade-off between the return they can get from the label and the extra costs they have to incur to
certify their products or to comply to the PDO technology (Bouamra-Mechemache and Chaaban
(2010)). In the absence of (or with low) certification costs, producers may have the incentive to
produce a high quality product. However, if that cost is too high, then this incentive is reduced
and producers may opt to produce a low quality (generic) product. Collusion on quantity can
then be a tool to overcome the quality provision concern. Actually, when certification costs are
high, collusion allows for individual profits that may compensate for PDO certification costs and
for the costs generated by the PDO technical requirements. In that case, PDO emergence is
more likely to occur in a monopoly-type industry structure than in a perfect competition one;
the intermediate structures leading to an intermediate quality likelihood (Lence et al. (2007)).
It turns out that the profitability of labeling is determined by various factors such as supply
control conditions (Lence et al. (2007)) and market structure (Hayes et al. (2004)). For instance,
Carriquiry and Babcock (2007) show that monopolists are more likely to invest on quality be-
cause they can get the full return from their investment in reputation. Langinier and Babcock
(2008) suggest that a high number of producers may benefit from sharing the certification cost
but suffer from the loss of profit due to intensive competition. In addition, PDO labels segment
the market into PDO and non PDO sub markets. This market segmentation affects market
structure. It relaxes the market competition pressure for firms producing PDO products and
allows firms to survive on the market.
This paper makes a number of contributions. First, while the theoretical literature on the prof-
itability of a public quality label is extensive, empirical findings are scarce. We fill this gap by
analyzing how a PDO-like label can contribute to the success of firms that voluntarily enter into
such a quality certification scheme.
Second, we use two original data sets that cover the period 1990–2006 and which provide very
detailed information at the firm-level on the characteristics of firms and products in the French
dairy sector. The first one is an annual firm survey that covers firm-level data, while the second
3In 2010, AOC labeled products included 48 cheese and 40 other food products (among which there were 13
AOC labels for fruits and vegetables, 13 for olive and olive oil, and 6 for meat). There is in addition 394 PDO
wine for which a specific European regulation applies. Because cheese represents the main products under the
AOC label, we focus on the cheese sector.
4The INAO is in charge of PDO certification in France and decides whether or not a PDO label can be created.
Then, all firms within the specific PDO area can get the label as far as they fulfill the requirements imposed in
the PDO specification.
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is an exhaustive annual survey of all dairy plants. It provides information on individual produc-
tion at a detailed product category level. Such information, which is quite difficult to obtain at
the individual level, enabled us to distinguish between AOC and non-AOC dairy plants. We use
the information to assess for the first time the impact of AOC labelling on firm performance.
The performance of dairy firms is measured by their life duration on the market or “survival.”
It is one of the most widely used empirical measure of performance (Foster et al. (2008)). Firm
survival has been shown to be strongly related to other performance measures, such as prof-
itability and growth, and provides a better understanding of industrial strategies (cf. Dunne
et al. (1988)).
Third, our empirical strategy relies on discrete-time duration models that specify duration de-
pendence in a flexible way. We propose a semiparametric approach, introducing some parametric
restrictions while retaining some flexibility in modeling the survival. The empirical modeling
thus assumes a parametric form for the effect of the determinants on survival, but allows the
form of the underlying survival function to be unspecified and controls for unobservable hetero-
geneity. To ensure the validity of our empirical strategy and check the absence of selection bias,
we first check if the decision of a firm to enter the AOC labeling scheme is independent from
the variables that explain the differences in firm survival. Adjusting for differences in this set of
covariates thus removes biases in the comparison between AOC and non-AOC firms, allowing
for a causal interpretation of those adjusted differences in survival.
The article is organized as follows. The next section reviews the determinants of firm survival.
Section 3 provides an overview of the data set and discusses its strengths and weaknesses for
measuring firm survival. Section 4 presents the methodology used to estimate firm survival,
and Section 5 provides the main estimation findings. The final section discusses conclusions and
implications for future research.
2 Determinants of Firm Survival
The relation between firm performance and firm survival has been empirically shown in the
literature. The measurement of performance through total factor productivity has been showed
to affect survival (Bellone et al. (2006) and Foster et al. (2008)). In addition, low performance
is observed some years before their failure (Kiyota and Takizawa (2006)). Different factors may
explain survival. Various ”stylized facts” have been drawn from the empirical literature on firm
survival, entry, and exit. These facts apply in many countries and for many industrial sectors
(Geroski (1995) and Caves (1998)). Both industry and firm characteristics influence a firm’s du-
ration in the industry. Substantial rates of entry and exit are recurrently found in a number of
countries. In this section, the main findings are summarized. We use these findings to construct
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an empirical strategy for testing the determinants of firm dynamics in the French cheese sector.
Table 1 about here
Table 1 summarizes the determinants of firm survival found in the literature. Firm age
is an important feature of firm survival. New firms face high risk of failure during the first
years of their existence (newness). Their capacity to survive depends on their ability to gather
market information and to modify their strategy to the post-entry environment. Firm mortality
then declines over time. The oldest firms may suffer from erosion of technology and products
(obsolescence) over time, so their failure rate may be high (aging). However, they may also
benefit from strong trademarks that help them increase their longevity.
Firm size is also a major determinant of survival (smallness). This factor is relevant both
for new and old firms, but its impact is stronger on the dynamics of new firms. According to
Aldrich and Auster (1986), different factors may explain that fact. First, small-sized firms may
have more difficulty raising capital. Second, tax law can be more detrimental on small firms
than on large firms. Third, public regulation may affect small firms more than large firms. In
addition, large firms may be favored in a competitive labor market. Considering that the failure
rate increases with the size of the irretrievable outlay needed to move from minimal-scale (or
fringe entry) to optimal-scale operations, the size of the irretrievable outlays also affects firm
survival. Thus, small firms may have a high failure rate as they may find it difficult to reach
a minimum size at which they will be able to operate efficiently. Another explanation of the
size-based impact on survival is related to labor and capital costs. If these two costs are high,
this could be detrimental to newer, smaller firms that may have more difficulty in developing
their activities than do older, larger firms. In addition to age and size, the structure of the firm
may also affect a firm’s dynamics. As shown by Disney et al. (2003), when an establishment
is part of a group, it increases its survival rate relative to that of a single establishment. This
supports the suggestion that establishments that are part of a group can learn from other estab-
lishments in the group and get better market information compared to that obtained by single
establishments.
The survival rates for firms are also shaped by entrepreneurial factors including managerial
abilities. Entrepreneurship characteristics, such as human capital as well as specific education
and skills or the personal characteristics of the founder of the firm, have been shown to be a
key determinant of firm survival and of small businesses in particular (Vivarelli and Santarelli
(2007)). Innovation ability is another factor that influence the hazard rate (Helmers and Rogers
(2010)). Evidence from the UK industry shows that innovation through trade-marking decreases
the probability of exit in almost all economic sectors while the impact of innovation through
5
patenting is less clear and heterogeneous depending of the sector.
Last, public intervention may be a key factor for the agricultural and food industry. For in-
stance, government payments in the United States have been shown to increase slightly the
survival of farm businesses, particularly that of bigger farms (Key and Roberts (2006)). In this
article, we focus on the impact of government intervention on agro-food firms through the PDO
labeling regulation, and we analyze how this public labeling scheme, that can be voluntary and
collectively used by groups of producers, has contributed to the development of dairy firms and
to the current structure of the dairy industry.
Firm dynamics also depends on the characteristics of the industry under consideration. Com-
parison between different industries in different countries reveals common industry determinants
for survival patterns. Both firm entry and concentration depend on the depth of the incum-
bents’ commitments and, more generally, on trade barriers, which have an impact on survival
duration. Trade barriers in an industry can arise from high minimum efficiency scale (MES),
capital intensity, advanced technology, or product differentiation and innovation. On the one
hand, a high MES implies a relatively large amount of resources that are needed to reach the
MES level. If firms cannot achieve this level of resources, they may not be able to survive on
the market. On the other hand, firms that have entered the market will be less sensitive to
market exit if they have incurred large resource expenditures. A high level of innovative activity
in an industry may make entry more risky and may increase failure risk (Jensen et al. (2008)).
However, the reverse could be also true if there is a self-selection process used by a firm before
making an entry decision. Moreover, some knowledge spill-over may be available to firms that
are close to innovative firms. Agglomeration or regional advantages may compensate for the
negative effects of higher costs and of competition from other firms in the same area. Falck
(2007) and Fritsch et al. (2006) empirically show the importance of these regional effects on sur-
vival. The distribution of innovations between new and incumbent firms is reported to change
over an industry’s life cycle (Agarwal and Gort (2002)). These changes affect the probability of
survival for firms within three phases: lower survival rate occurs in the early phase of their life
cycle, when innovation is high and market entry risky. A higher survival rate occurs in the next
phase when the market is mature and competitiveness has increased as a result of limitations in
innovation and technical change rates. Finally, during obsolescence of initial endowment phase,
the failure rate increases again
We analyze the impact on firm dynamics of the most relevant factors identified above, i.e., age,
size, size disadvantage (whether its level of output is below the MES), and single or multi-
establishment firm. Using the example of the French cheese industry, we study the impact of
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adopting the AOC label.5 When adopted by firms, AOC labeling may result in higher costs
linked to quality requirements and certification costs. It results that firms that adopt PDO
labeling may suffer from a higher cost disadvantage, everything else being unchanged, which
may drive them out of business. On the other hand, with the PDO label, they may benefit
from a high-quality signal and a higher reputation for their products which could compensate
for their cost disadvantage. We try to disentangle this trade-off by assessing the impact of the
AOC label on firm survival and by measuring the relative importance of the selected relevant
factors.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use exhaustive firm and dairy plant surveys covering the period 1990–2006 provided by the
French Administrative Direction of Statistics (INSEE). The first data set reports economic and
administrative information at the firm level (EAE) while the second set reports productions at
the plant level for dairy firms (EAL).6 The first set is available only for firms with more than
20 employees, while the second set is exhaustive at the France level.
The proportion of AOC labeled products in the total production of cheese is approximately
17% (and 20% in value). In France, AOC cheese seems to benefit from a price premium com-
pared to non AOC (branded or not branded) cheese. The price of AOC cheese is on average
58% higher than for non AOC cheese in 2009-2010.7 For the French camembert cheese, the price
premium linked to the AOC characteristic is of the same order of magnitude as for the brand
characteristic but the willingness to pay for the AOC characteristics seems to be higher under
a private retailer brand compared to a firm national brand (Hassan and Monier-Dilhan (2006)
and Bonnet and Simioni (2001)). We focus in this study on AOC cheese made from cow (30
AOC) and sheep (3 AOC) milk which represents 97% of the milk used in the processing of AOC
cheese.8 Each observation provides information on firms that might be constituted of different
5The data used do not allow us to analyze the impact of firms’ branding strategy. It is true that there are
strong national brands either on AOC or non AOC cheese that may impact the survival in addition to the AOC
label. This may be partly captured by the size as it should concern well known large companies.
6EAE stands for Enquête Annuelle d’Entreprise while EAL is the Enquête Annuelle Laitière, both provided
by INSEE.
7Data for cheese sold in supermarkets, hypermarkets and hard discount, which represents around 85% of total
sales (CNAOL and INAO (2010)). Note in addition that the price premium for PDO (the EU equivalent for
AOC) is 23 % for food products (Deselnicu et al. (2011)).
8Data from EAL do not allow the identification of AOC among firms producing cheese from goat milk. AOC




The survival analysis was performed on the 1430 firms, observed during the period 1990–
2006, for which we were able to identify if the firm was producing cheese with an AOC label or
not. The final data set provides information on all firms involved in cheese production.9 Among
the firms observed in the period, cheese production may or may not be the main activity of
the firm. When firms have other activities, cheese is most often the main one; other activities
typically include dairy products other than cheese. We choose to do the analysis at the firm level
rather than at the plant level because an AOC strategy is decided at the firm level and not at the
plant level.10 Moreover, firm level analysis enables us to take into account firm characteristics
that may influence firm survival. Entry and exit data correspond to the creation and closing of
a firm. Firms are considered to be active as long as at least one of its plants is active (i.e., is
producing cheese).
Table 2 about here
We compute the time spell corresponding to the survival of the surveyed firms and define
entrant, exitor, one-year-only and stayer as in Disney et al. (2003) (see Table 2). By design,
these periods are evaluated as intervals, measured in years, over the period 1990–2006. Indeed,
our data indicate whether a firm was present in the sample for a given year. But, if a firm
disappeared from the sample in the following year, the exact time (day or week) the exit oc-
curred is not known. In this case the transition times are said to be grouped and discrete-time
hazard models are used to analyze such data. Thus, the minimum time unit is one year, with
a maximum of 17 years. On average, a firm survives 8 years in the industry, over the period
considered (see also Figure 7 in appendix).
Table 3 about here
The pattern of entry and exit in our sample is summarized in table 3.11 Compared to other
studies, the cheese sector in France exhibits a low rate of turnover with only 8% of firms in
the market a given year exiting the market and only 5% entering, meaning that the French
9Accounting data are not available for plants that are reported in EAL and that are not linked with firms
present in the EAE baseline. These plants are reported as small firms of less than 20 employees.
10For firms less than 20 employees, the firm and the plant levels coincide. For larger firms, a firm chooses its
portfolio of productions and the locations of the production (which correspond to the plant level).
11We do not provide trends in the panel of AOC producing cheese. Indeed, many AOC firms produce also other
cheeses that are not AOC labeled. Moreover, the share of AOC in the firm’s production differs from one to the
other and the choice of different thresholds to define when a firm is considered as an AOC firm may induce very
different trends. More information is available upon request to the authors.
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cheese sector becomes more concentrated over time, i.e., the number of firms in the market
decreases over time. Between 1990 and 2006, the number of firms decreased by 40% from 924
to 559. Entry and exit rates in the French cheese sector are in the range of values found in
the literature for manufacturing industries. For instance, Caves (1998) reports entry and exit
rates in several countries and found entry rates varying from 3% to 13% and exit rates from
5% to 13%. These values are higher in the study of Disney et al. (2003) who found an entry
rate of 18.5% and exit rate of 16.5% in the food, drink, and tobacco sector in the U.K. in the
period 1986–1991. Similarly, Fritsch et al. (2006) reports that the survival rate after two years
for start-up firms in the food sector is around 72%.12 In addition, reported entry and exit rates
in these articles suggest that the food sector is among the industries showing the lowest entry
and exit rates. Another feature is that entry and exit rates are both relatively low, which is
consistent with the report of Geroski (1995) (stylized fact 3) who states that net entry rates and
penetration are modest fractions of gross entry rates and penetration. Moreover, the net exit
rate is quite low (3%), which suggests that the French cheese sector is in a rather mature stage
of its life cycle (Agarwal and Audretsch (2001) and Jensen et al. (2008)). Now, we consider the
covariates we can observe and that can affect the survival of the dairy firms. In tables 4 and
5, we define several variables of interest in the analysis performed here. These variables include
the main determinants of firm survival found in the literature. We define time-varying as well
as time-constant variables for the purpose of this analysis.
Table 4 about here
Table 4 presents definitions of the time-constant variables created and used in the first step
of the survival analysis presented below. We consider that a firm is an AOC firm whenever at
least one of its plants produces an AOC labeled cheese during the whole period. Half of the
observed firms were AOC firms for at least one year. Old indicates whether the firm was or was
not present before the beginning of the period under scrutiny.13 MESD indicates whether a firm
has or has not reached the minimum efficiency scale as defined by the median firm production,
by cheese category, during the whole period.14 The cheese industry is mainly composed of small
firms (SmallD). We observe a large majority of firms with less than 20 employees on their first
annual report (78%). On the contrary, big firms (BigD) are those with more than 100 employees;
12The study of Disney et al. (2003) analyzes the pattern of industries using plant data while the one of Fritsch
et al. (2006) considers only very small firms. These features may explain their high values; the smaller the
production unit, the higher the turnover.
13The information on the precise age of the firm is not available for all firms that were present before the
beginning of the period under scrutiny.
14The partitioning of firms according to cheese production category shows that one third devote their main
production to hard cheese, 22% to semi-hard cheese, and 18% to soft cheese; the remaining firms producing blue,
processed, fresh, and other cheeses.
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they are a bit less numerous than firms of medium size (MediumD). Unfortunately, the data at
hand do not provide detailed information about the precise age and size of firms.15 We use also
a categorical variable, SizeD, defined according to the number of employees. That variable is
also used in the Kaplan-Meier analysis of section 5. Table 5 presents the time-varying variables
used in the second step of the survival analysis. These variables are defined according to a firm’s
time-constant variables in table 4, but now vary with time, with the noticeable exception of the
variable Old. We do not report the annual summary statistics of those variables16. On average
the share of AOC production relative to the total cheese production of the firm each year is quite
stable (around 45%). The share of large firms increases over the period from 9% in 1990 to 14%
in 2006, while the share of small firms decreases from 79% to 67%. Note that, as mentioned
above, the total number of firms has decreased during the same period.
Table 5 about here
4 Empirical Methodology
Over the period covered by the surveys (1990–2006), three different time spells can be described:
(1) a complete time interval in which a firm enters the sample before 1990 and exits before 2006;
(2) a right-censored time interval in which a firm enters after 1990 and is still active in 2006;
and (3) a left-truncated time interval in which a firm entered before 1990 and either exits before
2006 or is still active in 2006. We identify this latter type of time interval because the surveys
indicate if a firm was active or not before 1990. However, for most of the firms that were active
before 1990, we do not know when they were created. Fortunately, left truncation will not affect
the maximum likelihood estimators presented below. As shown by Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal
(2008), the correct contribution to the likelihood of a left-truncated firm under delayed entry is
obtained by discarding the periods preceding 1990.
4.1 Nonparametric Approach
We use the Kaplan-Meier (Kaplan and Meier (1958)) estimator following the philosophy of the
nonparametric analysis, i.e., of letting the data speak for themselves by making no assumption
about the functional form of the survival.The Kaplan-Meier estimator can be used to compare
survival curves across the values of the covariates. Testing a difference between the estimated
15We could not use a continuous size variable, because we only have the number of employees for the subsample
of firms having more than 20 employees. We code this variable according to the size classes defined by the French
administrative direction of statistics (INSEE). We then define three classes in order to have enough firms in each
class.
16They are available from the authors upon request.
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survival functions is also possible using statistical tests. However, these tests do not provide
strong evidence that the considered covariate influences survival because other factors may be
correlated with both this covariate and with survival. Thus, the effects of the covariates cannot
be modeled explicitly using this estimator.
4.2 Semiparametric Approach
To overcome the limitations mentioned above, we propose a semiparametric approach, introduc-
ing some parametric restrictions while retaining some flexibility of the nonparametric framework
in modeling survival. The most widely used semiparametric model in continuous-time survival
analysis is the so-called proportional hazard model (Cox (1972)).17 This model assumes a para-
metric form for the effect of the covariates on survival, but allows the form of the underlying
survival function to be unspecified. Thus, the survival time of each firm i is assumed to follow
the hazard function given by:





where xi is a vector (k× 1) of the covariates, γ is a vector (k× 1) of the parameters, and h0(τ)
is the baseline hazard function (the hazard when each covariate xji = 0) whose functional form









does not depend on time. Note that an exponentiated parameter represents the hazard ratio for
a one unit change in the corresponding covariate, controlling for the other covariates.
The equivalent of the continuous-time proportional hazard model defined in equation (1) in
discrete-time is the complementary log-log model (see Cameron and Trivedi (2005) or Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal (2008) for a proof) defined as:
cloglog(hi,s) = α1d1,s + α2d2,s + . . .+ αJdJ,s + x
′
i,sγ, (2)
where hi,s denotes the discrete-time hazard function for firm i at year s, d1,t, . . . , dJ,s are dummy
variables for years 1, . . . , J , J referring to the last time period observed for any firm in the
17See the overview of recent industrial organization literature on firm survival by Manjón-Antolin and Arauzo-
Carod (2008).
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sample, with dt,s = 1 if s = t, 0 otherwise, and the complementary log-log transformation is
defined as:
cloglog(hi,t) ≡ ln {− ln(1− hi,t)} . (3)
The parameters γ in equation (2) are identical to the parameters in the underlying continuous-
time proportional hazards model defined by equation (1). This means that the complementary
log-log model coefficients have a direct relative risk interpretation as noted above. Similarly,
the time-specific constants αt can be written as function of the baseline hazard function h0(τ).
By estimating these parameters freely for each time-point, no assumption is done regarding the
shape of this baseline hazard function within the time intervals. Thus, the complementary log-log
model retains some of the flexibility of the nonparametric approach. The problem of unobserved
heterogeneity stems frequently from incomplete specification in equation (1). The solution is to
incorporate multiplicative, unobserved heterogeneity that is uncorrelated with regressors. This
individual unobserved heterogeneity component is known in the survival analysis literature as
“frailty.” It is a multiplicative term and, thus, measures a proportional increase or decrease in
the hazard rate relative to that of an average firm. In the proportional hazard model defined in
equation (1), unobserved heterogeneity is thus accounted by the inclusion of the multiplicative
term νi, which is assumed to be positive, i.e.,





The random variable ν summarizes the impact of “omitted variables” on the hazard rate, whether
the missing regressors are intrinsically unobservable or simply unobserved in the data at hand.
Alternative interpretations are proposed in terms of errors of measurement in recorded regressors
or recorded survival times.
The corresponding discrete-time complementary log-log model with frailty now becomes:
cloglog(hi,s) = α1d1,s + α2d2,s + . . .+ αJdJ,s + x
′
i,sγ + εi, (4)
where εi = log(νi). Usually, it is assumed that εi, or, equivalently, νi, is generated according
to a given parametric distribution function. The usual generating distribution functions are
the gamma and the Gaussian distributions. The first distribution function is often chosen in
continuous-time duration models, not only for analytical convenience but also for theoretical
reasons (see Abbring and Van Den Berg (2007)). Instead, in discrete-time duration analysis, the
assumption of a Gaussian distribution can be computationally convenient. Moreover, a recent
simulation study by Nicoletti and Rondinelli (2010) shows that an incorrect Gaussian assump-
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tion for the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity does not bias the duration dependence
or the covariate coefficient estimates. This suggests that choosing a Gaussian distribution can
be viewed as a sensible choice when estimating discrete-time duration models.
Parameters in equation (2), i.e., when no frailty is assumed, can be estimated using maxi-
mum likelihood techniques applied to a binary choice model with a complementary log-log link.
Indeed, by construction, each firm’s survival story is broken into a set of discrete time units that
can be treated as distinct observations. Then, a binary choice model that predicts whether exit
did or did not occur in each time unit can be estimated. More formally, it can be easily shown
that:
hi,s = Prob[Ti = s| Ti ≥ s, xi]
= Prob[yi,s = 1| xi], (5)
where yi,s is an indicator for the exit occurring at time s for firm i. Unobserved heterogeneity
can be accounted for by including random effects εi, i = 1, . . . , n, in this binary choice model
framework (see equation (4)). If a specific parametric distribution is assumed for these random
effects, calculating the marginal likelihood function involves now a one-dimensional integral that
can be computed numerically by using, for instance, a Gauss-Hermitte quadrature (see, among
others, Judd (1998)) or simulation methods (see, among others, Train (2009)). Finally, note that
a natural choice for parameterizing the probability Prob[yi,s = 1| xi] would be to use a logit link
in equation (2) (or in equation (4) when frailty is assumed in the discrete-time duration model)
as usually done in binary choice models. This model is most appropriate when events can only
occur at regular, discrete times as noted by Jenkins (2005).18
5 Results
Before assessing the impact of AOC labeling on firm’s survival, the issue of firm selection between
entering or not into the AOC scheme should be addressed.19 More specifically, the independence
between the firm decision to enter into the AOC labeling scheme and the variables that explain
the differences in firm survival has to be checked. If the entry decision is independent from our
selected explanatory variables, then the differences in performance between AOC and non-AOC
firms with the same values for these covariates are due to the status of the firm. Our empirical
18In our application, exit of a firm can occur at any point of time during the year. Ties occur because this event
is measured coarsely by considering the year where it happens. Thus, the logit model does not seem appropriate
for our data.
19For a complete discussion on the issue of selection on observables, see Imbens and Wooldridge (2009).
13
strategy could be viewed as assuming that beyond the chosen observed covariates, there are no
(unobserved) firm characteristics associated with both the survival and the status of the firm.
However, our empirical strategy corrects this assumption by introducing unobserved heterogene-
ity when estimating hazard rate, through a multiplicative term capturing the impact of omitted
variables on the hazard rate. Figure 1 displays the estimated densities of propensity scores for
AOC and non-AOC firms. Propensity scores are estimated using a probit model where the
probability of being an AOC firm is explained by Mediumt, Bigt, MES and Old. Densities are
then estimated using the nonparametric Nadaraya-Watson estimator. Clearly, the two estimated
densities overlap, indicating that the probit model has poor predictive performances. This result
is confirmed when considering two usual measures of predictive performances of binary response
models, the correct classification rate and the area under the receiver operators characteristics
(ROC) curve whose values are 62.48% and 0.64 respectively.20 In other words, this result in-
dicates that no selection on the observables seems to occur, allowing the investigation of AOC
labeling on firm performances after having controlled for the chosen covariates.
Figure 1 about here
We now evaluate the effect of each variable described in table 4 separately using the nonpara-
metric Kaplan-Meier estimator of survival function. This descriptive analysis is a preliminary
exploration of firm survival in the period, and is completed by a multivariate analysis, measuring
the effect of the complete set of covariates, allowing interactions between the covariates.
5.1 Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates
Figure 2a displays the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival function in the whole sample. We
focus on the main determinants identified in the literature (see section 2) and analyze the impact
of the age and size of the firm on firm survival. In addition, to test the role of productivity,
we estimate the Kaplan-Meier probabilities for firms producing above or under the minimum
efficiency scale level. Figures 2b-d present the estimated survival curves and their respective
95% confidence intervals.
Figure 2 about here
20The ROC curve for a binary classification problem plots the true positive rate as a function of the false
positive rate. The points of the curve are obtained by sweeping the classification threshold from the most positive
classification rule to the most negative. For a fully random classification, the ROC curve is a straight line
connecting the origin to (1, 1) and the area under this curve, or AUROC, is equal to 0.5. Any improvement
over random classification results in an ROC curve at least partially above the straight line. With a perfect
classification, AUROC = 1.
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We obtain no clear results when considering the age effect, but older firms seem to have a
higher failure rate than young firms for some time intervals (figure 2b). On the contrary, firm
size is a key determinant of cheese firm survival. The survivor curve of the large firms is less
steep than the survivor curve of small firms (figure 2c). While there is a clear difference between
small (<20 employees) and medium-size or large firms, the survival patterns were not very dif-
ferent between the medium-size and large firms.21 Finally, exceeding the minimum efficiency
scale significantly increases the survival of firms (figure 2d).
Table 6 about here
Statistical tests can be used to confirm the qualitative results found above and used to sub-
stantiate the validity of the differences previously observed between survivor curves. We use
log-rank tests within the family of tests proposed by Harrington and Fleming (1982). The null
hypothesis is that two (or more) survival curves that have been estimated by the Kaplan-Meier
estimator are equal to each other. The test outcomes (values of the statistics and their p values)
are given in table 6. They show that the aforementioned differences between the survivor curves
are not only visually apparent but also statistically significant. Thus efficiency scale, age, and
size are important factors that determine the risk of exit at any time. These results are consis-
tent with the main findings of the literature on firm survival that were discussed in section 2.
Figure 3 about here
One feature of the French cheese industry is the existence of a AOC labeling policy. Here,
we use the same methodology to asses the impact of AOC labeling on firm survival. Figure
3a reports the estimated survival curves for two cohorts of firms, producing or not producing
AOC-labeled cheese. The two curves display slightly diverging patterns, AOC firms having a
lower probability of exit than non-AOC firms. The log-rank test (table 6) confirms that this
difference is significant. A closer investigation of this effect is provided in figures 3b, 3c, and 3d
where we distinguish firms according to size category.22 We find a large and statistically signifi-
cant effect of AOC labeling when considering small firms (<20 employees) while this effect does
not show up for larger firms (see table 6). These results support our hypothesis that the AOC
21In addition, because of the existence of large groups in the French dairy cheese sector, we analyzed whether
survival probability differs when a firm is part of a group. We also investigated whether holding several plants has
an influence on survival. Both of these two determinants positively affect the survival rate. However, as they are
highly correlated with the variable Size, they also capture a size effect, with larger firms facing a lower probability
of exit, whatever the duration. We do not report the detailed results. They are available upon request
22We cross the AOC factor with other factors (age, MES) and fail to detect any significant effect.
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quality scheme positively affects the survival of small cheese makers in the French dairy industry.
The Kaplan-Meier estimates of firm survival have the advantage of providing a good descrip-
tive analysis of survival without specifying any functional form for the survival pattern and they
highlight the differences between firm cohorts (AOC, age, type, etc.). However, this approach
is limited when survival is investigated on firm sub-cohorts and the effect of variables on the
hazards of firms becomes difficult. In order to overcome this problem, and give more structure
to the estimation, we now investigate the effects of covariates on the hazard in the multivariate
framework presented in section 4.2.
5.2 SemiParametric Results
To analyze more formally what is behind the findings discussed above, we now turn to a semi-
parametric analysis. Table 7 shows the estimation results for four discrete-time proportional
hazard models. In the first column of the table, we present estimates of a complementary log-
log model that does not include any potential, unobserved individual heterogeneity (model 1).
Dummies denoted by year = j, j = 2, . . . , 16, are created to represent the years where a firm
may be present in the sample. The covariates are the time-varying variables presented in table
5. In the second column of table 7, estimates of the same model, but now incorporating different
effects of AOCsharet with respect to the size of the firm (small, medium, or big) (model 2), are
reported. Models 3 and 4 correspond to models 1 and 2, respectively, but include an unobserved
individual heterogeneity term. The latter is assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution. The
relative importance of unobserved individual heterogeneity for the two models is indicated by
the estimates for parameter ρ, which measures the share of individual variation in the hazard
rate that is due to variation in the unobserved factors.23 Tests can be performed to assess if
this share is significant or not. Thus, if the null hypothesis of ρ = 0 cannot be rejected, we can
conclude that frailty is unimportant. Estimates of models 3 and 4 are given in the third and
four columns of table 7, respectively.
Table 7 about here
For both models 3 and 4, the tests for unobserved individual heterogeneity, i.e., the likelihood
ratio tests of the null hypothesis of ρ = 0, allow us to reject the null hypothesis that unobserved
individual heterogeneity is not relevant.24 Accounting for unobserved individual heterogeneity





2/6) where the denominator
captures the total heterogeneity in the hazard rate.
24This test is a boundary test that takes into account that the null distribution is not the usual chi-square
distribution with 1 degree of freedom but is an equi-proportionate mixture of a chi-square variate with 0 degrees
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significantly increases the respective likelihoods. Moreover, the share of individual variation in
the hazard rate, due to variation of unobserved factors, accounts for nearly 83% of the total vari-
ation in the hazard rate for the two model specifications. In other words, ignoring unobserved
individual heterogeneity would not be a good idea when discussing the impacts of the covariates
on the hazard rate. For instance, comparison of the estimates of models 1 and 2 (without frailty)
with those of models 3 and 4 (with frailty) reveals that, even if the qualitative results for the
frailty models do not differ from those for no frailty ones; the estimates of the coefficients of the
covariates in the models with frailty are much larger in absolute value than those of non-frailty
models, as expected (Jenkins (2005) and Gullstrand and Tezic (2008)). Therefore the following
analysis will focus on the estimation results of models 3 and 4.
Models 3 and 4 differ in how the effect of the firm’s share of AOC in total cheese production
is modelled. A direct effect of AOCsharet on the rate of hazard is considered in the first model
while AOCsharet interacts with the size of the firm in the second. To choose between the
two models, we note that the likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that the effect of
AOCsharet is the same, regardless of the size of the firm. Results in table 7 show that while
increasing the volume of AOC-labeled production significantly reduces the probability of failure
(model 3), cross-effect estimates from model 4 are significant only for small firms. Thus, engag-
ing in AOC production increases significantly the survival of small firms but there is no such
evidence for larger firms. This does not suggest that AOC labeling is not profitable for larger
firms. It may be a useful tool among others (e.g., brand strategy, production diversification) for
large firms to increase their profits, but it is not a key determinant for their profitability. On
the contrary, the AOC labelling scheme seems to affect the survival of smaller cheese makers by
equipping them with a reputable signalling tool that is well recognized by French consumers.
Notice that being a larger firm increases significantly the probability to survive. Larger firms
may be able to benefit from economies of scale and scope and invest more to develop their
brands, differentiate their products, or increase their production capacity. The AOC labeling
policy can be seen as a public intervention tool for small firms that are less able to invest in order
to make their products known by consumers. Finally, results show that even if AOC labeling
is a key driver of firm survival, firm efficiency (producing at or above the minimum efficiency
scale) remains a highly significative determinant of profitability and survival.
of freedom, which is a point mass at zero and a chi-square variate with 1 degree of freedom; see Self and Kung-Yee
(1987).
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To better visualize the effect of AOC labeling and its interaction with other covariates, we
proceed with the prediction of the hazard rate using frailty model 4. We start with predicting:
z(s) = α̂1d1,s + α̂2d2,s + . . .+ α̂JdJ,s + x
′γ̂ + ε,
for given values of the covariates x and values of the unobserved heterogeneity term ε, using the
estimated coefficients (α̂, γ̂) of models with frailty. Then, the hazard rate can be predicted as
h(s) = 1− exp (− exp (z(s))) ,
using the reciprocal of the complementary log-log transformation defined in equation (3).
In order to investigate more precisely the impact of AOC labeling policy, we fix the values of
the covariates and consider an hypothetical small firm which was created before 1990 and which
produces cheese with a small proportion of AOC cheese (20%) and below the minimum efficiency
scale. Given the parameter estimates, this firm has the lowest survival rate. It will serve as
a baseline to analyze the impact of AOC labeling and its interaction with other covariates.25
The number of possible combinations of covariate is high, leading to a high number of potential
simulations. We choose to focus on the combinations that stress the cross effects of AOC labeling
with the size and efficiency effects.
Figure 4 focuses on small firms and helps in understanding the impact of the label for
different firm characteristics. It presents the predicted survival curves for the baseline firm and
two other firms (plain lines). The first one differs from the baseline in the variable MES while
the second one differs in MES and OLD. While age, efficiency but also AOC policy do not seem
to influence the survival rate in the first 3 years, the pattern of survival is greatly influenced
after 3 years. Compared to the baseline, the predicted survival rate is higher for a hypothetical
firm which is more efficient (above the MES). The highest survival rate is achieved for a firm
which in addition has been created after 1990. Comparing these three hypothetical firms with
cases where firms are more specialized in AOC production (changing the share of the firm’s
AOC production from 20% to 80%; dotted lines), the ranking of the survival curves remains
unchanged. In these simulations, specialization in AOC production increases the survival rate
by up to 25%. In addition, it is noteworthy that, in our simulated framework, the variable AOC
and MES have an effect of the same order of magnitude on the baseline firm’s survival. Finally,
the simulations suggest that the AOC effect on survival remains strong over time except for the
baseline. For the baseline, the dotted and the plain curves converge toward zero with time. This
suggests that the AOC labeling policy is an effective tool in maintaining the activity of small
25In all cases, predictions are derived assuming that the frailty term is set equal to its mean value.
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firms over the medium term, at least for young and more efficient firms.
We perform the same simulation analysis on a hypothetical medium-size firm in figure 5. We
do not report simulations for a large firm as they are almost identical to the medium size firm
case. For a medium (or big)-size hypothetical firm, the survival rates are higher than for the
small firm case in figure 4. While the ranking of survival curves are unchanged compared to the
small firm case, the magnitude of the MES and OLD effects is lower. In addition, the gap in
survival between the baseline and the two other simulated firms increases over time.
Figures 4 and 5 about here
In figure 6, we compare the AOC effect for different size classes. This figure clearly highlights
the size effect which is the main determinant of firm survival in the French cheese sector. It shows
that the probability of survival after10 years for an hypothetical small firm is quite small (less
than <20%), while that for large/medium firms is more than 80% and it remains relatively high
even after 15 years. Predictions show no differences in the survival rate between the medium and
large firms in the 8 first years, and a small difference after that period. When the hypothetical
small firm becomes more AOC label oriented, its predicted survival rate is increased, but remains
far below the rate for a larger firm. Thus a labeling strategy seems unable to compensate for
the size effect on the survival rate.
Figure 6 about here
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we assess the ability of a quality labeling policy to sustain the competitiveness
of agro-food firms involved with such a policy and determine which firms have benefited from
it. We focus on AOC quality labeling and investigate how AOC labeling has contributed to the
development of dairy firms and to the current structure of the dairy industry. The analysis uses
a unique and detailed database on French dairy firms that comprises accounting and production
data. The performance of dairy firms is measured on the basis of their duration on the market
or survival. We use recent statistical methods to analyze duration data in order to estimate the
impact of AOC labeling as well as other determinants of firm survival. These methods allows
for controlling unobserved heterogeneity. We show that this feature was important in our data
and emphasize the need to control for it in order to get consistent estimation. Our results show
that the voluntary use of AOC labeling does contribute to increase the survival of firms in the
dairy industry. We also find that the AOC labeling effect is less pronounced than the size effect.
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As in many sectors, the size effect is the main determinant of firm survival in the dairy indus-
try. However, when the AOC effect interacts with the firm size effect, we show that the benefit
of being more specialized in AOC production does exist for small firms but does not exist for
larger firms. Encouraging AOC production reduces thus the risk of exiting only for small firms.
Public intervention in this industry is thus well designed to increase the competitiveness of small
firms by enabling the coexistence in the market of both small and large firms. AOC labeling
conveys a collective reputation based on traditional and less capital intensive methods. Small
firms that voluntary engage in AOC production can share the cost of labeling and benefit from
minimum reputation without incurring large advertising/R&D expenditures. However, AOC is
less important for larger firms’ survival than for small firms. Larger firms can make a better use
of capital intensive technology and benefit from scope or scale economies or from other quality
signalling tools (branding). In this way, AOC labeling can act as a differentiation tool in the
market, a tool by which small niche firms are able to survive because of reduced price compe-
tition. This generates a lower hazard rate for firms. We can presume that without the label
policy, the decrease in the number of small firms would be even higher. Further work and more
detailed data on dairy markets are needed to better understand how such a label policy affects
dairy market structure.
Appendix
Figure 7 about here
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Tables
Table 1: Determinants of Firm Survival






Capital and labor cost –/+
Establishment is part of a group +
Productivity +
Industry characteristics
Barrier to entry –/+
Innovativeness –/+
Early stage in life cycle –/+
Agglomeration and technological spill over +
Table 2: Definition of Firm Entry and Exit Types at Different Times (t)
t− 1 t t+ 1
Exitor Observed Observed Not observed
Entrant Not observed Observed Observed
One-year-only Not observed Observed Not observed
Stayer Observed Observed Observed
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Table 3: Number of Firms as well as Stayer, Entrant, Exitor, and One-Year-Only Firms
Year Firms Stayers Entrants Exitors One-Year-Only
N N % N % N % N %
1990 924 823 89 30 3 71 8 0 0
1991 872 771 88 21 2 85 10 5 1
1992 809 725 90 25 3 64 8 5 1
1993 783 685 87 39 5 62 8 3 0
1994 753 621 82 32 4 102 14 2 0
1995 707 589 83 63 9 59 8 4 1
1996 674 610 91 25 4 41 6 2 0
1997 653 518 79 21 3 117 18 3 0
1998 642 518 81 99 15 28 4 3 0
1999 652 573 88 38 6 41 6 0 0
2000 643 569 88 34 5 43 7 3 0
2001 614 577 94 13 2 24 4 0 0
2002 607 562 93 17 3 28 5 0 0
2003 596 546 92 15 3 36 6 1 0
2004 585 528 90 24 4 38 6 5 1
2005 570 519 91 21 4 32 6 2 0
2006 559 540 97 19 3 . . . .
Mean 693 607 87.6 34 5 54 8 2 0.3
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Table 4: Time-Constant Variables
Variable Unit Definition Mean Sd
AOC dummy = 1 if Firm is producing AOC cheese 0.50 0.50
Old dummy = 1 if firm created before 1990 0.62 0.49
MESD dummy = 1 if firm’s production is above the Minimum 0.54 0.50
Efficiency Scale of its specific cheese industry
SmallD dummy = 1 if number of employees < 20 is the first observation 0.78 0.42
MediumD dummy = 1 if 20 ≤ number of employees< 100 in the first observation 0.12 0.33
BigD dummy = 1 if number of employees ≥ 100 in the first observation 0.10 0.30
SizeD 0, 1 or 2 = 0 if SmallD = 1; 1 if MediumD = 1; and 2 if BigD = 1
Table 5: Time-varying variables
Variable Definition
AOCsharet Share of AOC production relative to the total cheese
production of the firm in year t (0 if not producing)
MESt = 1 if Firm’s production is above the Minimum Efficiency
Scale of its specific cheese industry in year t
Smallt = 1 if 20 ≤ number of employees < 100 in year t
Mediumt = 1 if number of employees ≤ 20 and < 100 in year t
Bigt = 1 if number of employees ≥ 100 in year t
Table 6: Log-rank tests
Null hypothesis Log-rank p value
statistics
{HO: No impact of MESD} 86.34 0.000
{HO: No impact of SizeD} 23.66 0.000
{HO: No impact of Old} 8.57 0.003
{HO: No impact of AOC} 29.68 0.000
{HO: No impact of AOC}forSmallfirms 40.81 0.000
{HO: No impact of AOC}forMediumfirms 0.81 0.368
{HO: No impact of AOC}forBigfirms 0.72 0.397
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Table 7: Complementary log-log model
Models Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coef. (s.e.) Coef. ( s.e.) Coef. ( s.e.) Coef. ( s.e.)
year=2 0.131 0.135 0.132 0.135 1.043*** 0.236 1.096*** 0.243
year=3 0.136 0.139 0.135 0.139 1.619*** 0.326 1.694*** 0.337
year=4 0.001 0.149 0.001 0.149 1.915*** 0.394 2.010*** 0.407
year=5 0.586*** 0.132 0.589*** 0.132 2.946*** 0.454 3.065*** 0.470
year=6 0.225 0.158 0.233 0.158 3.023*** 0.524 3.182*** 0.544
year=7 -0.025 0.177 -0.017 0.177 3.013*** 0.565 3.189*** 0.587
year=8 0.854*** 0.143 0.864*** 0.143 4.227*** 0.603 4.421*** 0.627
year=9 -0.348 0.231 -0.337 0.231 3.285*** 0.662 3.483*** 0.685
year=10 -0.219 0.236 -0.204 0.236 3.475*** 0.672 3.685*** 0.697
year=11 0.088 0.217 0.105 0.217 3.958*** 0.689 4.168*** 0.714
year=12 -0.485 0.286 -0.469 0.286 3.497*** 0.726 3.705*** 0.749
year=13 -0.166 0.263 -0.149 0.264 3.944*** 0.734 4.169*** 0.759
year=14 -0.290 0.287 -0.272 0.287 3.926*** 0.755 4.161*** 0.781
year=15 -0.046 0.271 -0.029 0.271 4.331*** 0.770 4.569*** 0.796
year=16 0.067 0.264 0.079 0.264 4.493*** 0.775 4.717*** 0.801
AOCsharet -0.678*** 0.097 -1.020*** 0.196
Mediumt -1.042*** 0.135 -1.270*** 0.167 -2.134*** 0.264 -2.617*** 0.329
Bigt -1.261*** 0.178 -1.369*** 0.195 -2.703*** 0.380 -3.007*** 0.428
MESt -0.198** 0.076 -0.192* 0.076 -0.651*** 0.158 -0.671*** 0.160
Oldt 0.253*** 0.077 0.270*** 0.077 0.432* 0.181 0.471* 0.184
AOCShareSmallt -0.764*** 0.101 -1.228*** 0.210
AOCSharMediumt 0.169 0.319 0.433 0.504
AOCShareBigt 0.060 0.587 0.350 0.921
Constant -2.323*** 0.111 -2.316*** 0.111 -4.456*** 0.471 -4.550*** 0.489
ρ̂ 0.829 0.038 0.839 0.036
Log-Likelihood -2913.766 -2909.557 -2896.871 -2891.482
LRT of ρ = 0 :
Chi-square value 33.790 36.151
p value 0.000 0.000
LRT of the same effect of
AOCsharet whatever the
size of the firm
Chi-square value 10.779
p value 0.005
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate the statistical significance of the estimated parameters at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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